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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last survey1 of this field, the author expressed the hope that
the 1965 Florida Legislature would adopt the Uniform Commercial
Code,2 and on June 3, 1965, the Code was adopted with a lack of pub-
licity usually reserved for some special interest bill.3 The U.C.C. will be-
* Professor of Law, University of Miami. The materials surveyed herein extend from
157 So.2d through 177 So.2d 328, and legislation enacted by the 1965 General Session
of the Florida Legislature.
1. Murray, Negotiable Instruments, 18 U. MIAMI L. REV. 416 (1963).
2. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1962 Official Text with Comments [hereinafter referred
to and cited as the U.C.C. or the Code].
3. Fla. Laws 1965, chs. 65-254, FLA. STAT. chs. 671-680 (1965).
225
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
come effective in Florida on January 1, 1967, in order to give the Florida
Bar an opportunity to become acquainted with its intricacies during the
interim period. The former Negotiable Instruments Law4 and a few sec-
tions of the Florida Banking Code5 will be replaced by Articles 3 and 4
of the U.C.C.
Article 3 of the U.C.C. has been described as "substantially old wine
in new bottles"' in that it does not drastically change the concepts con-
tained in the former Negotiable Instruments Law. It is submitted that this
picturesque metaphor may tend to obscure the fact that, although there
are relatively few dramatic changes, there are enough significant changes
to warrant a close study of Article 3. Article 3 has codified much of the
case law developed under the N.I.L., but a goodly portion of this case
law reflects the minority view in the United States and there are enough
changes to create traps for the non-discerning lawyer. No lawyer can
ignore the commercial code; it affects the law of negotiable instruments,
banks and banking, as well as sales, securities, warehouse receipts, bills
of lading, bulk sales laws, letters of credit, secured transactions (chattel
mortgages, trusts receipts, conditional sales contracts, etc.), contracts,
torts, property, corporations, etc.
Space limitations do not permit a comprehensive analysis of articles
3 and 4. Superb analyses of these Articles are readily available to the
bar.7 It is suggested that every Florida attorney should obtain a copy
of the 1962 Official Draft of the Uniform Commercial Code,' Uniform
Commercial Code Handbook' and, if feasible, an annotated edition of the
Uniform Commercial Code' ° as a bare minimum working library.
4. FLA. STAT. chs. 674-676 (1963) [hereinafter, N.I.L.].
5. FLA. STAT. §§ 659.26, 659.31, 659.34, 659.37, 659.39-40 (1963) are repealed by FLA.
STAT. § 680.10-102(1) (1965).
6. LEARY, COMMERCIAL PAPER, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE HANDBOOK 87 (1964).
7. E.g., Ibid.; HUoGINs & PHEMISTER, BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS, UNIroRM
COMMERCIAL CODE HANDBOOK 129 (1964); HAwKLAND, COMMERCIAL PAPER (1959);
CLARKE, BAILEY & YOUNG, BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS (1963); HAWKLAND, A
TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COM-MERCIAL CODE 380-565 (1964). For brilliant
but trifle dated critiques, see Britton, Formal Requisites of Negotiability-The Negotiable
Instruments Law Compared with the Proposed Commercial Code, 26 ROCKY MT. L. REv.
1 (1953); Britton, Transfers and Negotiations Under the Negotiable Instruments Law and
Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 TEXAS L. REV. 153 (1953); Britton, Holder
in Due Course-A Comparison of the Provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law with
Those of Article 3 of the Proposed Commercial Code, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 417 (1954);
Britton, Defenses, Claims of Ownership and Equities-A Comparison of the Provisions of
the Negotiable Instruments Law with Corresponding Provisions of Article 3 of the Pro-
posed Commercial Code, 7 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1955).
8. 1962 Official Text With Comments. Many sections of the U.C.C. are unintelligible
without the use of the comments; this is particularly true in Articles 2 (Sales), 7 (Ware-
house Receipts, Bills of Lading and Other Documents of Title) and 9 (Secured Transac-
tions: Sales of Accounts, Contract Rights and Chattel Paper).
9. Note 7 supra.
10. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (Master ed. 1965); ANDERSON'S COMMERCIAL CODE
(2 volumes 1961 with 1965 Cumulative Supplement); Bender's Uniform Commercial Code
Service (1965).
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The remainder of this article will first discuss the significant cases
in the law of negotiable instruments and banks and banking which were
decided during the preceding two year period, and then will compare the
results obtained with the expected effect of the U.C.C.
II. JURISDICTION
The signing of a promissory note in Florida is not a sufficient act,
in itself, to constitute carrying on or engaging in a business venture
within the terms of the Florida statute" which provides for the service
of process upon non-residents. However, jurisdiction may be perfected
under this statute when (1) the promissory note is signed in order to
end litigation which had been commenced by personal service upon
the signers, and (2) when the acts of a non-resident corporation (which
was doing business within the state) are chargeable to the signers of the
note as officers of the corporation . 2
Under the law of Ohio, a cognovit note which provides that the
maker authorizes any attorney in "any Court of record within the
United States"'" to confess judgment, and which fails to state the place
of execution or delivery of the note, is void for uncertainty. A judgment
entered in Ohio, pursuant to this clause, is void for lack of jurisdiction. As
a result, an Ohio judgment entered pursuant to the confession of judg-
ment clause, supra, is not entitled to full faith and credit in Florida.
Cognovit notes are forbidden by a Florida statute 4 as well as the
laws of the vast majority of the states. The U.C.C. does not change this
rule, but simply provides that a confession of judgment clause does not
destroy negotiability even though it may be invalid under a statute or case
law.1
5
The Florida courts will have jurisdiction when a non-resident plaintiff
garnishes the bank account of a non-resident defendant in a quasi-in rem
action."6
The relationship between a bank which issues an irrevocable letter
of credit and the beneficiary of the letter is not a relationship of debtor
and creditor such as would give the court where the issuing bank is lo-
cated jurisdiction of a res upon which its judgment can operate. The letter
of credit becomes a binding contract when it is delivered to an honoring
bank, without any regard to the underlying contract or to any dispute
which may arise between the parties. Hence, when a customer deposits
11. FLA. STAT. § 47.16 (1965).
12. Odell v. Signer, 169 So.2d 851 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
13. Henry Bierce Co. v. Hunt, 170 So.2d 99 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964), following Rosen v.
Albert, 165 N.E.2d 844 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1960).
14. FLA. STAT. § 55.05 (1965).
15. U.C.C. § 3-i12(1)(d) and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 673.3-112(i)(d) (1965).
16. Payton v. Swanson, 175 So.2d 48 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
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money in a Florida bank to protect the bank in its issuance of a letter
of credit (issued and delivered to a Swiss bank with a Swiss national as
the beneficiary), the customer may not enjoin the issuing bank from pay-
ing on the letter of credit because of a dispute between the customer
and the beneficiary, in the absence of jurisdiction over the letter of credit
which is not within Florida."
The Code's articulation of the rules governing letters of credit does
not expressly cover the jurisdictional aspects of the above case. It does,
however, provide that an irrevocable letter of credit, once established
with regard to the beneficiary, can be modified or revoked only with his
consent,18 and that the issuer who acts in good faith is not liable or re-
sponsible for the performance of the underlying contract, for sale or
other transaction, between the customer and the beneficiary.'9 Further,
an issuer must honor a draft which complies with the letter of credit
"regardless of whether the goods or documents conform to the underlying
contract for sale or other contract between the customer and the bene-
ficiary."' 0 The Code additionally provides that in all other cases the is-
suing bank may in good faith honor the draft or demand for payment
against its customer despite notification from the customer of fraud,
forgery or other defect not apparent on the face of the documents, "but
a court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin such honor."'" It would
appear that the Code has re-enforced the underlying rationale of this
case.
III. AGENCY
In Schor v. Industrial Supply Corp.2 promissory notes were signed
in the following manner:
Raleigh Water Heater Mfg. Co., Inc.
Leo Schor.
Schor brought suit for reformation of the instruments alleging that they
were signed in this fashion by mistake, and that they were intended to be
notes of the corporation alone. The court denied the relief holding that
if there was any mistake, it was a unilateral one, and furthermore that it
would be impossible to put all the parties into the status quo because of
the bankruptcy of the corporation. The court stated that "there was no
indication that Leo Schor signed in a corporate capacity .... ,23 Query:
If Leo Schor did not sign in a corporate capacity, who signed the instru-
ment in behalf of the corporation? As stated in the preceding survey,24
17. Tueta v. Rodriguez, 176 So.2d 550 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
18. U.C.C. § 5-106(2) and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 675.5-106(2) (1965).
19. U.C.C. § 5-109(1)(a) and Comments, FiA. STAT. § 675.5-109(1)(a) (1965).
20. U.C.C. § 5-114(1) and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 675.5-114(1) (1965).
21. U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(b) and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 675.5-114(2)(b) (1965).
22. Schor v. Industrial Supply Corp., 173 So.2d 710 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
23. Id. at 711.
24. Murray, Negotiable Instruments, 18 U. MiAmi L. REV. 416, 417 (1963).
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the Uniform Commercial Code2 should result in a reversal of this
Florida rule, which prevents the introduction of parol evidence by the
signer in a suit between the immediate parties to show that he signed
the instrument as an officer of the corporation and not in his individual
capacity, when the instrument discloses the name of a corporation which
might be the principal.
In a case of first impression,26 the district court of appeal held that
when a person has acquired bearer bonds from the owner by larceny,
trick or other fraudulent means, and he then delivers the bonds to a
stockbroker as an agent for collection, the stockbroker is not guilty of
conversion if he acts in good faith. The rationale is not based upon any
theory of negotiation to a holder in due course, because there is no ne-
gotiation; there is merely a delivery to an agent for collection. The
result is based upon a principle of the law of agency that;
if an agent, on account of his principal, sells a negotiable in-
strument, the holder of which has the power to pass title, the
agent does not convert the instrument if he sells it without
notice of the rights of the person entitled to possession, although
his principal is not a bona fide holder of the instrument.27
The court also rejected the proposition that the mere fact that the stock-
broker accepted bonds from a person who had a bad reputation in the
community should be enough to cast the loss upon the broker because
of its negligence; if there were any actionable negligence, it was com-
mitted by the owner in placing the bonds in the hands of a person with
a bad reputation.
The U.C.C. preserves the same rule in somewhat simpler language.28
However, it must be noted that bonds have been removed from the
classification of commercial paper and reclassified as "Investment Secu-
rities" under article 8 of the Code. 9
IV. REAL AND PERSONAL DEFENSES OF THE ORIGINAL PARTIES
The number of cases asserting real and personal defenses of the
original parties has shown a dramatic increase over the preceding two
year period. It is a debatable question whether this increase demonstrates
a lowering of business ethics or an increasing sophistication of the prac-
ticing bar.
A. Alteration
The cancellation, by the.holder, of the signature of a co-maker of a
note operates as a material alteration of the note under the Florida
25. U.C.C. § 3-403 and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 673.3-403 (1965).
26. McAlister v. Bache & Co., 169 So.2d 332 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
27. RESTATEMENT, AGFNCY 2d § 349(g).
28. U.C.C. § 8-318 and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 678.8-318 (1965).
29. U.C.C. §§ 3-101, 8-101 and Comments, FLA. STAT. §§ 673.3-102, 678.8-102 (1965).
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statute"0 and abridges the rights of the other co-maker who signed the
note as surety for the co-maker whose name was stricken. As a result,
this operates as a discharge of the mortgage given by the surety-co-maker
as security for the note."' This same result would obtain under theU.C.C.82
B. Duress
Duress may be a real or a personal defense, depending upon the
degree of duress exercised against the drawer of a check.3 This distinc-
tion in the degrees of duress was seemingly overlooked by the Second
District Court of Appeal which held that the holder of a check who took
without notice of the alleged duress would be able to enforce payment
against the drawer.3 4
The U.C.C. does not purport to state a uniform rule as to the degrees
of duress, but has left this a matter of local policy. As a result,
the adoption of the Code will not necessarily result in the overturning
of this case.88
C. Mistake
A maker of a renewal note is precluded from asserting the defense
of mistake when a partial payment had been made on the original note
prior to the execution of the renewal note. This will be true even though
the maker may have been unaware that the payment had been made by
another, in his behalf, before he executed the renewal note.86
An insurance company which has issued its check in settlement of
a claim, and then later discovers that its contract of insurance had lapsed,
may stop payment of the check and prevail in an action for rescission of
the check upon the ground of unilateral mistake of fact, unless the
payee has so changed his position that it would be inequitable to permit
rescission.87 Assuming that the payee in the above case was not a holder
in due course (a payee may be a holder in due course under the
U.C.C.), 8 the holding of this case would be the same under the Code. 9
In the absence of a showing of fraud, mistake or over-reaching, a
court of equity does not have the power to reform a promissory note.
30. FLA. STAT. § 675.32 (1963).
31. American Mortgage & Safe Deposit Co. v. Rubin, 168 So.2d 777 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1964).
32. U.C.C. §§ 3-407, 3-606 and Comments, FLA. STAT. §§ 673.3-407, 673.3-606 (1965).
33. BRrrTON, BILS AND NOTES 360-362 (2d ed. 1961).
34. Acker v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 173 So.2d 170 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965). The
drawer alleged "that she made this check out under great fear of bodily injury, although
it is not disputed that she actually signed the check."
35. U.C.C. § 3-305 and Comments, FIa. STAT. § 673.3-305 (1965).
36. Watson v. Central Fla. Properties, Inc., 172 So.2d 608 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
37. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Krasnek, 174 So.2d 541 (Fla. 1965), reversing Krasnek v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 158 So.2d 580 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
38. U.C.C. § 3-302(a) and Comments, FA. STAT. § 673.3-302(2) (1965).
39. U.C.C. § 3-306 and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 673.3-306 (1965).
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Further, the maker who seeks reformation of the note must tender pay-
ment of those sums of money which he admits are due as a condition
precedent to relief.4 0
D. Fraud
Some of the dangers inherent in dealing with promissory notes
and mortgages were illustrated in Vance v. Fields.41 A husband and wife
executed a promissory note and mortgage to a home improvement com-
pany. The home improvement company then somehow obtained a
second promissory note for the same amount as the original promissory
note. The home improvement company then negotiated the second
promissory note and the original mortgage to the plaintiffs, but the
original mortgage was not delivered to them. The plaintiffs recorded their
assignment of the mortgage, and three days later the home improvement
company negotiated the original note and original mortgage to the de-
fendants. The court held that the second note did not refer to the original
mortgage, and that the negotiation of this note did not give the plaintiffs
any interest in the original mortgage. The assignment of the mortgage
without the assignment of the debt did not create any rights in the
plaintiffs, and their recording of their "assignment" did not afford them
any greater protection because the assignment was invalid.
The U.C.C. does not specifically cover all of the facts of the above
case; however, it does provide that the "filing of a document does not of
itself constitute notice within the provisions of this Article to a person
who would otherwise be a holder in due course."42 It has been generally
held that any purported assignment of the mortgage without the "assign-
ment" of the debt is a nullity, and that an assignment of a mortgage to
one person and the subsequent negotiation of the note to another will
give the latter person the rights of a holder in due course to the note and
the mortgage, even though the former "holder" of the mortgage records
his assignment first.48 In short, the protection of the recording laws are
illusory when one is dealing with notes secured by mortgages. The holding
of the above case will probably remain unaffected by the U.C.C.
When a buyer-mortgagor has instituted a suit for damages for the
alleged fraud of the seller-mortgagee in the sale of the property, it is
proper for the seller-mortgagee to counterclaim for a declaratory decree
as to the validity of the note and mortgage.44
40. Freitag v. Simon, 171 So.2d 918 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
41. 172 So.2d 613 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
42. U.C.C. § 3-304(5) and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 673.3-304(5) (1965).
43. Foster v. Augustanna College & Theological Seminary, 92 Okla. 96, 218 Pac. 335
(1923), reviews the authorities on this problem. See also BRrrroN, BInLS AND NOTs 281
(2d ed. 1961).
44. Rice v. Fremow, 165 So.2d 447 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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E. Execution of the Instrument
A promissory note signed by a husband and wife, without the wife's
signature being formalized in accordance with the law respecting con-
veyances by married women, will not subject her separate property to
the claim of the payee during coverture or after the marriage has been
dissolved by divorce.45 The U.C.C. is not intended to affect any local stat-
ute which requires signatures to be formalized in any specific manner. 6
There is no presumption that a signature appearing on an instru-
ment is genuine, and when a proper plea denies its genuineness it must
be proved by the holder of the instrument. If the holder brings suit
against the maker's estate, which denies the genuineness of the maker's
signature, the holder's affidavit of genuineness is inadmissable under
the dead man's statute.
Under the narrow facts of the above case, the results would be the
same under the U.C.C. However, when suit is brought against an alleged
signer of an instrument who is alive, the U.C.C. provides that the burden
of proof of establishing the genuineness of the signature after it has been
denied by the alleged signer is upon the party claiming under the signature
but he is aided by a presumption that it is genuine.48
F. Consideration
A Florida statute49 forbids the payment of a commission to a real
estate salesman (or an unlicensed salesman) rather than to a broker.
This statute is not violated when the buyer of a piece of property agrees
to assume the burden of paying a real estate commission and issues a
promissory note to a broker who simultaneously agrees to assign a portion
of the proceeds to an unlicensed salesman, who subsequently assigns
his interest to another person. In effect, the maker of the note (or his
successor in interest) may not plead as a defense to an action on the note
that the payee has assigned an interest in the proceeds of the note to
an unlicensed real estate salesman. If the note is made payable originally
to the broker and the unlicensed salesman, it is voided by the statute;50
but if it is made payable to the broker alone, he may assign an interest
in it without coming into conflict with the statute.51 Although this deci-
sion would appear to be a triumph of form over substance, it does preserve
the commercial concepts underlying the field of negotiable instruments.
45. Pilson v. Guillery, 168 So.2d 547 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
46. U.C.C. § 3-401, Comment 2, FLA. STAT. § 673.3-401 (1965).
47. Link v. Patterson, 175 So.2d 213 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
48. U.C.C. § 3-307 and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 673.3-307 (1965).
49. FLA. STAT. § 475.42(1)(d) (1965).
50. Campbell v. Romfh Bros., Inc., 132 So.2d 466 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
51. Newcomer v. Rizzo, 163 So.2d 312 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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G. Equitable Defenses
In a suit at law on a purchase money mortgage note after the
mortgage has been foreclosed, the trial court must take into consideration
whether the mortgaged property has been re-acquired by the holder
of the note, the value of the property and "other equitable considera-
tions."52 In short, the equitable defenses to a deficiency decree in a court
of equity are now equally applicable to a suit on the note in a court
of law.
H. Death of a Joint Co-Maker
At common law the death of a joint co-maker of a promissory note
extinguished the obligation as to him, and only the surviving co-makers
were liable. This common law rule has been changed by statute.53 In a
case of first impression,54 the second district has held that this survival
statute does not make it mandatory for the holder of a promissory note
to file a claim against the estate of the deceased co-maker as a condi-
tion precedent to holding the surviving co-makers liable on the note.
The holder may, of course, file his claim in probate, but he need not do
so. The surviving co-makers may also file their contingent claims for
contribution against the estate.
The U.C.C. does not provide specifically for the above fact situa-
tion; however, it does preserve the concept that a prior presentment for
payment is not necessary in order to charge primary parties,5" and that
presentment for payment is entirely excused when a primary party to
a note has died, even though there happen to be secondary parties (in-
dorsees), which was not true in the above case.56
I. Interpretation and Parol Evidence
When the parties at the execution of the note strike from the note
a provision for the payment of interest after maturity, this creates an
ambiguity which permits the parties to introduce testimony showing
that they intended to exclude interest both before and after maturity. 7
The U.C.C.5 articulates a number of rules of construction for am-
biguous terms; the purposes of this section are to protect holders and
to encourage the free circulation of negotiable paper by precluding
resort to parol evidence except for reformation of the instrument. Ex-
cept as to reformation, these rules cannot be varied by proof that any
52. Maudo, Inc. v. Stein, 171 So.2d 403, 404 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
53. FLA. STAT. § 45.11 (1965).
54. Phillipi Creek Homes, Inc. v. Arnold, 174 So.2d 552 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
55. U.C.C. § 3-501 and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 673.3-501 (1965).
56. U.C.C. § 3-511(3) and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 673.3-511(3) (1965).
57. Southeastern Home Mortgage Co. v. Roll, 171 So.2d 424 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
58. U.C.C. § 3-188 and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 673.3-118 (1965).
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party intended the contrary."9 Although the precise situation presented
in the above case is not described in section 3-118, its general tenor and
purpose may restrict the operation of the above holding except in cases
of reformation.
Under the N.I.L., a note in which no time for payment is expressed
is payable on demand,"0 but parol testimony is permissible between the
maker and the payee to show that the parties intended that the note
was not to mature until some indefinite time in the future upon the pay-
ment of certain debts. This same rule seemingly would apply when the
note was "assigned" to a holder who would not be a holder in due
course because the note was not complete and regular on its face."'
The Code also provides that an instrument is payable on demand
when "no time of payment is stated. '0 2 It is submitted that it is unwise
to permit parol testimony when a statute provides for the construction
of an instrument; there is no ambiguity calling for parol evidence when
a statute clearly provides an interpretation.
When a demand note provides for "interest at 6% per annum after
maturity until paid," interest accrues from the date of issuance and
not from the date of demand.' It is difficult to predict what effect the
U.C.C. will have on this holding. The U.C.C. provides that "unless an
instrument provides otherwise, interest runs . . . from the date of de-
mand ' 6 4 which is an express rejection of the underlying rationale of
the above case; however, the courts may construe the wording of the
above note as coming within the phrase "unless an instrument provides
otherwise." It is submitted that the courts should follow the mandate
of the U.C.C., unless the wording of the demand instrument clearly
shows that interest was intended to run from a date different from the
date of demand.
V. ACcOMMODATION INDORSERS, SURETIES AND GUARANTORS
In the case of Weinstein v. Susskind"5 it was held that when a married
woman, who was a stockholder in a corporation, indorsed a note of the
corporation prior to delivery, she was primarily liable on the note. Since
she was primarily liable, no presentment for payment was necessary in
order to charge her on the note. Further, the fact that the holder of
the note delayed for more than five years after maturity in enforcing
the note would not discharge her because of her status as being primarily
59. U.C.C. § 3-118, Comment 1.
60. FLA. STAT. § 674.09 (1963).
61. Michael v. Schekter, 176 So.2d 581 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
62. U.C.C. § 3-108 and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 673.3-108 (1965).
63. Bryan v. First Baptist Church, 158 So.2d 140 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
64. U.C.C. § 3-122 and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 673.3-122(4) (1965).
65. Weinstein v. Susskind, 162 So.2d 683 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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liable. Finally, although a pledge by a wife of security on a note upon
which her husband is primarily liable amounts only to a pledge of the
security and not an unqualified indorsement, this rule does not apply
when a wife indorses in blank and pledges her security as an accommo-
dation "indorser" (the court must have meant accommodation maker
rather than indorser) of a note issued by a corporation because she is
primarily not secondarily liable. A similar result should obtain under
the U.C.C."
Section 46.11 of the Florida tatutesl7 provides that when a final
judgment is paid by a surety, indorser, or guarantor, the holder of the
judgment is to assign it (upon request) to the paying surety, indorser
or guarantor who will then be entitled to all the rights and remedies
of the original plaintiff in the judgment to "enforce the collection of
the same from the defendants who are liable as makers of the instru-
ments sued upon.""8 The second district has held that this statute does
not permit one co-guarantor of a note to pay the judgment, have it
assigned to him and then levy execution on the judgment against his
co-guarantor because the statute speaks of makers, not secondary
parties.69
The above section of the Florida statutes has not been expressly
repealed by the adoption of the U.C.C., thus the holding of the above
case should remain unimpaired.
When a mortgage is given to secure the payment of a note issued
by a third party, the mortgagors are discharged from their undertaking
when the creditors take a new note from the third party which extends
the time of payment. This result is based upon the concept that the mort-
gagors are acting as sureties, and any binding extension of time to the
debtor without the consent of the sureties discharges them.70 The Code
should not affect the result of this case. The Code provides that the holder
discharges any party to the instrument to the extent that without such
party's consent the holder
without express reservation of rights releases or agrees not to
sue any person against whom the party has to the knowledge
of the holder a right of recourse or agrees to suspend the right
to enforce against such person the instrument or collateral .... 71
The Comments to this section explain that these suretyship defenses
are not limited solely to parties who are "secondarily liable," but are
66. U.C.C. §§ 3-415, 3-501 and Comments, FLA. STAT. §§ 673.3-415, 673.3-501 (1965).
67. FLA. STAT. § 46.11 (1965).
68. Freed v. Giuliani, 164 So.2d 234, 236 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). The Court refused to
follow the contrary decision of Knight v. Weeks, 115 Fed. 970 (5th Cir. 1902).
69. Ibid.
70. Cole v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 183 So.2d 195 (Fla. 1966), reversing Exchange Nat'l
Bank v. Cole, 161 So.2d 715 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
71. U.C.C. § 3-606 and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 673.3-606 (1965).
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available to any party who is in the position of a surety, and he has a
right of recourse either on the instrument or dehors it.72 The Code
further provides that the word surety includes guarantor.73 It would
appear that the holder of a note who extends it for an additional period
(even if for a lesser amount) thereby releases the guarantor under the
Code unless the holder expressly reserves his rights against the guaran-
tor. On the other hand, a guarantor of a promissory note will be released
from liability when the creditor has altered the original note without
the consent of the guarantor; has failed to take due care of the primary
collateral for the loan; has failed to notify the guarantor of the misuse
of the loan funds; has failed to notify the guarantor of the refusal of
the Small Business Administration to approve the loan, and has altered
the interest rate of the original loan without the consent of the guar-
antor." Section 3-407 of the U.C.C.75 provides that an alteration which
is both material and fraudulent discharges any party whose contract
is thereby changed unless that party assents or is precluded from assert-
ing the defense. There would seem little doubt that the above case
would be resolved the same way under the Code. This view is further
re-inforced by section 3-6067" which provides that the holder discharges
any party to the instrument to the extent that, without such party's
consent, the holder "unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instru-
ment given by or on behalf of the party or any person against whom
he was a right of recourse" unless he expressly reserves his rights
against the surety.
Under the doctrine of election of remedies, the payee may not
proceed against indorsers or guarantors of chattel mortgage notes if
the payee has repossessed the collateral for the chattel mortgages. If
the collateral is in the possession of the payee and he fails to ex-
plain the reason for his possession, the court may apply the doctrine of
election of remedies.
7 7
VI. FORGED AND UNAUTHORIZED INDORSEMENTS
An alleged indorser whose "indorsement" appears in the form of a
typewritten indorsement cannot be held liable in the absence of proof
that he authorized the typewritten "indorsement" or adopted it as his
own.7 I The U.C.C. seems to preserve a similar rule.79
72. U.C.C. § 3-606, and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 673.3-606 (1965).
73. U.C.C. § 1-201(40), FLA. STAT. § 671.1-201(40) (1965).
74. Miami Nat'l Bank v. Fink, 174 So.2d 38 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
75. U.C.C. § 3-407 and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 673.3-407 (1965).
76. U.C.C. § 3-606 and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 673.3-606 (1965).
77. Romanach v. A. J. Armstrong Co., 172 So.2d 444 (Fla. 1965), reversing A. J.
Armstrong Co., Inc. v. Romanach, 165 So.2d 817 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
78. Southeastern Home Mortgage Co. v. Roll, 171 So.2d 424 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
79. U.C.C. §§ 3-401, 3-404 and Comments, FLA. STAT. §§ 673.3-401, 673.3-404 (1965).
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A complaint which alleged that the drawee paid a check bearing
the forged indorsement of the wife, one of two joint payees, is subject to
dismissal for failure to state a cause of action when it fails to allege
that the plaintiff-drawer sustained any damage by the payment to this
check. If the plaintiff-drawer had alleged that the debt for which the
check was given was not collected, or that he was being subjected to
a claim by the wife-payee on the original debt, this would be a sufficient
allegation of damage." The U.C.C. does not seem to provide expressly
for this situation. Ordinarily, suit against the drawee bank for con-
version would be brought by the payee whose signature was forged,
rather than by the drawer, but suit may be brought by the drawer upon
a proper allegation of damage as indicated by the principal case.8 The
Code does provide that the drawer-customer of a bank must report any
unauthorized indorsement to the drawee-payor bank within three years
after receiving the check from the drawee-payor bank 82 as a condition
for holding the bank liable.
The cause of action by a payee of a check in conversion against
a collecting bank which has collected the check by means of an unau-
thorized indorsement begins to run when the payee discovers the unau-
thorized indorsement. Further, since the payee's cause of action is based
upon conversion of funds paid on the check, it is not an action founded
upon an instrument of writing, and the three year statute of limitations
is applicable rather than the five year limitation statute governing
actions predicated upon an instrument in writing.8"
The Code provides that a collecting bank which has acted in good
faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial standards "is not
liable in conversion or otherwise to the true owner beyond the amount
of any proceeds remaining in his hands."84 Hence, a collecting bank
which has remitted the proceeds of a check which has a forged indorse-
ment would not be liable to the owner; to this extent the rule of the
above case will be overturned. The Code preserves the idea that the
drawee of a check who pays it on the strength of a forged or unau-
thorized indorsement is liable under the theory of conversion and not
on the instrument itself under any theory of acceptance of the in-
strument.
85
80. Bank of Miami Beach v. Newman, 163 So.2d 333 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) Pearson, J.,
(dissenting) was of the view that in an action based upon a breach of contract all that the
complaint is required to state is the making of the contract, the obligation assumed and
the breach. "The complaint is complete when these statements are supplemented with a
statement of the amount claimed in a prayer for relief." Id. at 334.
81. U.C.C. § 3-419(1)(c) and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 673.3-419(1)(c) (1965). See
also BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTEs 406-407 (2d ed. 1961).
82. U.C.C. § 4-406(4) and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 674.4-406(4) (1965).
83. Fidelity Nat'l Bank v. Valachovic, 163 So.2d 33 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
84. U.C.C. § 3-419(3) and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 673.3-419(3) (1965).
85. U.C.C. § 3-419(1) and Comments, FLa. STAT. § 673.3-419(1) (1965).
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VII. ACCELERATION
A clause in a promissory note which provides for acceleration of
the principle indebtedness upon default in the performance of the note
"or any instrument now ...securing this note"86 should be construed
to include a default upon a mortgage securing the note. If this mortgage
is a second mortgage which provides that a default in the payment of
the first mortgage constitutes a default in the second mortgage, then
the default in the first mortgage accelerates the principal amount due
under the promissory note.
When the makers of a promissory note simultaneously execute
a separate written agreement to furnish collateral to the satisfaction
of the payee's attorneys, and this agreement provides that the payment
of the note may be accelerated if the security is not furnished, this sep-
arate agreement enables the payee to accelerate the maturity of the
note in the same manner that an acceleration clause in a mortgage
enables the holder to accelerate the maturity of a promissory note.87
The rule of the above cases apparently has been codified in the
U.C.C.88
VIII. USURY
The U.C.C. will have no effect on the existing Florida interest and
usury laws, which shall take precedence over the Code. 9
In a case of apparent first impression in Florida, 0 the first dis-
trict has held that a "Morris Plan Bank" (now known as an "Industrial
Bank") may not deduct the statutory"' rate of interest of eight percent
per annum for more than one year, nor may it collect repayments of
principal on an installment basis during the term of the loan without
coming within the scope of the usury laws. Under this ruling, an In-
dustrial Bank which makes a three year loan at eight percent interest
may not discount twenty-four percent interest (three years times eight
percent interest), and then require the borrower to repay the loan in
monthly installments without committing usury. This holding seems to
confine the Industrial Banks to making one year loans and requiring
the borrower to buy a certificate of deposit for the face amount of the
loan payable in installments. After all the installments have been made
in the purchase of the certificate of deposit, the certificate is then ac-
cepted by the bank in payment of the original note. This holding also
86. Barone v. Waters, 165 So.2d 442, 443 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
87. Street v. Sugerman, 167 So.2d 112 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
88. U.C.C. § 3-119 and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 673.3-119 (1965).
89. FLA. STAT. § 680.10-104 (1965).
90. Silver Sands v. Pensacola Loan & Say. Bank, 174 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
91. FLA. STAT. § 656.17 (1965).
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appears to be a triumph of form over substance because the borrower
will still pay a large sum for the loan; however, the holding does seem
to be a perfectly correct tracking of the statute.
2
A promissory note which calls for payment of interest at five and
one-half percent per annum is not rendered usurious by a provision
which states that "past due principal and interest shall bear interest
from maturity at 10% per annum until paid.""3 As to the principal, the
note merely provides for a higher rate of interest if the principal amounts
are not paid at maturity. As to interest, although the clause provides
for the payment of interest upon interest, it is not usurious, nor does
it amount to a provision for the paying of compound interest. The
computation of interest upon interest is a substitute for prompt pay-
ment and indemnifies the creditor for his forbearance. It should be
noted that if the borrower were able to prove a corrupt, usurious intent
on the part of the lender by showing that defaults in the payment of
interest were planned in order to charge a higher rate of interest upon
interest, usury would be proved. However, usury will not be presumed.
On the other hand, when a lender's agent exacts a bonus or commission
from the borrower which makes the loan apparently usurious, there is
a presumption that the agent acted within the scope of his authority
in exacting the bonus and the burden of proof lies upon the lender to
rebut this presumption. 4
A note which provides for a non-usurious rate of interest for the
stated term of the note will be rendered usurious under an acceleration
clause which does not contain a provision for the elimination of un-
earned interest in the installments precipitated to maturity in the event
of default. This result will hold true even though the holder does not
elect to exercise the option to declare the entire amount of the note
due, but only to foreclose upon the past due installments. The majority
rule in the United States is apparently contra to this Florida rule which
has been characterized as "sui generis.195
The usury laws of Florida may not be circumvented by the lenders
insistence that the borrowers form a corporation as the ostensible bor-
rower and then individually guarantee the payment of the promissory
note. It would appear, perhaps, that the transaction will be upheld if
lenders make the loan through a foreign corporation and the note pro-
vides that it is to be governed by the laws of a foreign state which
does not have usury laws similar to Florida's?0
92. FLA. STAr. ch. 656 (1965).
93. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 165 So.2d 182, 183 (Fia. 3d Dist. 1964).
94. Applebaum v. Laham, 161 So.2d 690 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
95. First Mortgage Corp. v. Stellmon, 170 So.2d 302 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
96. Atlas Subsidiaries, Inc. v. 0. & 0. Inc., 166 So.2d 458 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
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A. Legislation
The usury laws were amended by providing that no individual
secondarily liable as indorser, guarantor, surety or otherwise on any
corporate obligation shall be required by any court to pay any interest
in excess of ten percent per annum. "No corporation, in any such pro-
ceeding in the courts of this state where the interest is proved to exceed
fifteen (15%) percent per annum, shall be required to pay any interest,
and in such event all interest shall be forfeited."9 This amendment
is not to have any effect on existing statutory provisions governing the
interest rates charged by banks, Morris plan banks, discount consumer
financing companies, small loan companies and domestic building and
loan associations.
IX. PLEDGES
The pledgee of a pledged promissory note which is in default may
maintain an action on it irrespective of the status of the obligation for
which the note was pledged, because the pledgee in suing on the pledged
note is not enforcing the obligation for which it was pledged but is
simply reducing the pledged note to judgment. The payee-pledgor is
not an indispensable party to this action, and any sums recovered by
the pledgee will be held mutually for his own benefit and the benefit
of the payee-pledgor. 9
The holding of the above case will remain constant under the
U.C.C., 9 although it would appear that the pledgee ("secured party"
under the wording of the Code) will be entitled to his collection costs in
reducing the note to judgment.'
X. RIGHTS OF THE REMITTER
A remitter who purchases a bank draft drawn by one bank upon
another bank and made payable to the remitter must offer to indemnify
the drawer-bank (upon its request), if he attempts to hold the drawer-
bank as a constructive trustee when his name has been allegedly forged
by the person who received the draft.' The U.C.C. provides that the
owner of an instrument which is lost, whether by destruction, theft or
otherwise, may maintain an action in his own name, and recover from
any party liable thereon, upon proof of his ownership and the facts
which prevent his production of the instrument. The court may require
97. FLA. LAWS 1965, ch. 65-299.
98. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. James Talcott, Inc., 164 So.2d 264 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1964).
99. U.C.C. §§ 3-201(1)(2), 3-303, 9-207(1) and Comments, FLA. STAT. §§ 673.3-
201(1)(2), 673.3-303, 679.9-207(1) (1965).
100. U.C.C. §§ 9.207, 9-501-9-504 and Comments, FA. STAT. §§ 679.9-207, 679.9-501,
679.9-504 (1965).
101. Cornwall v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 159 So.2d 677 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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security to indemnify the defendant against loss by reason of any
further claims on the instrument. 102 The word "action" is defined in
the Code as including "recoupment, counterclaim, set-off, suit in equity
and any other proceedings in which rights are determined."' 0 3 It would
appear, therefore, that the Code has re-affirmed the holding of the
above case.
XI. DIScHARGE OF INSTRUMENTS AND THE UNDERLYING
OBLIGATIONS
Under a plea of partial payment of a note and mortgage, the
mortgagor is entitled to prove that he and the mortgagee orally agreed
that the mortgagee would accept payments from a third person who
had purchased other property from the mortgagor under some kind
of a payment installment contract.0 4 The opinion failed to indicate
whether the third party had bound himself to make these payments to
the mortgagee. It would appear that the U.C.C. has specifically pro-
vided for this situation by stating that "[p]ayment or satisfaction may
be made with the consent of the holder by any person including a
stranger to the instrument."' 0' 5
When the holder and the maker of a promissory note enter into
an accord and satisfaction agreement, the holder cannot unilaterally
return a minor portion of the satisfaction (certain equipment) and
then claim that an accord and satisfaction was never reached because
it was executory. 00
The U.C.C. does not attempt to cover the field of accord and satis-
faction, but it does provide that any party to an instrument may be
discharged from his liability on it by any other act or agreement with
another party which would discharge his simple contract for the pay-
ment of money.0 7 Under this provision, the parties to an instrument
may agree to the receipt of merchandise or equipment in payment of a
negotiable instrument.
Cancelled checks in the hands of the drawer coupled with his
testimony that he was not indebted to the payee are not sufficient to
prove the existence of a debt owed to the drawer by the payee who
died after the checks were paid. A cancelled check is not per se indicative
of a debt between the payee and the drawer; it may evidence a sale
of property, a gift, or some other transaction.'"
102. U.C.C. § 3-804 and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 673.3-804 (1965).
103. U.C.C. § 1-201(1) and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 671.1-201(1) (1965).
104. Azar v. Lewis, 175 So.2d 234 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
105. U.C.C. § 3-603(2) and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 673.3-603(2) (1965).
106. Rosenfeld v. Glickstein, 159 So.2d 670 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
107. U.C.C. § 3-601(2) and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 673.3-601(2) (1965).
108. Stebnow v. Goss, 165 So.2d 251 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). The court held in passing
that the drawer's testimony that he was not indebted to the payee was objectionable be-
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There must be an express agreement that the giving of a negotiable
instrument should constitute payment of an account before it will be
given this legal effect. °9 This rule has been preserved by the U.C.C."10
In case of first impression in Florida,"' the second district has
held that under the Florida statutes, 112 a drawee bank which fails to
return a check which has been delivered to it for payment, before the
end of the business day following its receipt, is deemed "to have paid
the check,""' and it may not return it later because the drawer's
account was insufficient to cover the check.
The above sections of the Florida statutes will be repealed by the
Code when it becomes effective."' Under the Code, a "payor" bank
becomes accountable for a check if it "retains the item beyond mid-
night of the banking day of receipt without settling for it or, regard-
less of whether it is also the depositary bank, does not pay or return
the item or send notice of dishonor until its midnight deadline.""15 It
is to be wondered if the time limits prescribed by the Code are not
too restrictive?
XII. JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS
One of the dangers implicit in joint savings accounts was illustrated
in Kramer v. First Nat'l Bank."' An account was established with the
defendant-bank in the name of the plaintiff and her minor daughter
as joint tenants. The mother became ill and the daughter and her aunt
(the sister of the mother) signed forms that the passbook had been
lost; the bank apparently permitted the withdrawal of all of the funds
from the account. The court held that the Florida statutes"17 permit a
minor joint tenant to withdraw all the funds from an account. The
bank had a rule that passbooks must be presented for all withdrawals;
however, the court "did not reach the question of whether the rule rela-
tive to passbooks could be waived by the bank and one joint depositor."" 8
cause it was an attempt to testify indirectly to a fact which he could not testify directly
because of the "Dead Man's Statute," EA. STAT. § 90.05 (1963). In the absence of the
disinterested testimony, it would appear that the dead man's statute effectively blocks re-
covery in a case of this type.
109. Wishart v. Gates Rubber Co. Sales Div., Inc., 163 So.2d 503 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
110. 108 U.C.C. § 3-802 and Comments, FLA. STAT. § 673.3-802 (1965).
111. Exchange Nat'l Bank v. C. D. Sheffield, 166 So.2d 807 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). The
fifth circuit has held the same way in its interpretation of Florida law. General Fin. Corp.
v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 264 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1959).
112. FLA. STAT. §§ 676.07-08, 676.55 (1963).
113. Note 109 supra, at 808.
114. FA. STAT. § 680.10-102 (1965).
115. U.C.C. 4-301 § 4-302(a) and Comments, FiA. STAT. §§ 674.4-301, 674.4-302(1)
(1965).
116. 163 So.2d 341 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
117. FLA. STAT. §§ 656.32, 656.33, 659.28, 659.29 (1963).
118. Supra note 114, at 342.
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A donee-wife has the right to withdraw all of the funds from joint
bank accounts during the last illness of her husband even though he
might have been incompetent at the time she withdrew the funds, when
it was shown that the bank accounts "were created as joint accounts,
sufficient to establish an inter-vivos gift by donative intent for trans-
fer of a present interest, delivery of the right of full withdrawal, and
acceptance by the donee."" 9
The vexing evidentiary questions involving "donative intent" (which
were raised in the above case) in joint savings accounts in federal sav-
ings and loan associations, should at long last be cured by an amend-
ment to the Florida statutes which provides:
The establishment of a stock account, savings share account,
or investment share account in joint and survivorship form
shall, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, be conclusive
evidence, in any action or proceeding to which either the asso-
ciation or the surviving shareholder or shareholders may be a
party, of the intention of all such shareholders or account
holders to vest title to such share accounts, and the additions
thereto, in such survivor or survivors.120
XIII. BANKS AND BANKING
It is not error for a trial court to set aside a default judgment and
a writ of scire facias against a garnishee-bank which proved that the
officer who had the duty to answer the original garnishment proceed-
ings was suddenly hospitalized without warning and was prohibited
by his doctor from transacting any business until after the writ of scire
facias was issued. 2'
A. Legislation
Section 4-403 of the U.C.C. provides that oral stop orders will be
binding upon banks for a period of fourteen days; however, this provi-
sion has been eliminated from the Florida version'22 of the U.C.C. In
Florida all stop-orders will have to be in writing and a bank will not
be liable for paying a check on the same day in which a written stop-
order is received unless the payment is in "willful and intentional dis-
regard of such order." Further, the bank which pays a check in viola-
tion of a stop-order will be liable for not more than
119. McGillen v. Gumpman, 171 So.2d 69, 70 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965). For a case holding
that there was insufficient evidence for donative intent, see Demps v. Graham, 157 So.2d
534 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
120. FLA. LAWS 1965, ch. 65-463 amending FiA. STAT. § 665.15 (1963). (Emphasis
added.)
121. Terrazzo & Marble Supply Co. v. Columbia Bank, 173 So.2d 475 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1965). For a case holding a bank liable for the fraudulent actions of one of its officers
in releasing collateral security for a letter of credit, see Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Banner
Trading Co., 157 So.2d 201 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
122. FLA. STAT. § 674.4-403 (1965).
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the actual loss incurred by the customer resulting from the
wrongful payment . . . , not exceeding the amount of the item
unless the bank is guilty of gross negligence or unless such
wrongful payment was made as a result of the wilful and in-
tentional disregard by the bank of such order.
In addition to adopting the Code, the Legislature also made changes
in the general banking laws. Section 654.04 of the Florida statutes was
amended by providing that Florida savings banks which have deposits
belonging to the estate of any deceased person whose residence was in
another state at the time of his death shall pay the amount of the de-
posits to foreign personal representatives at any time after three months
from the time that the foreign personal representative received his let-
ters of authority, unless the bank has received written notice of the
appointment of a Florida personal representative. Payment to the foreign
personal representative shall be a valid discharge for the money so
paid. 2 ' A similar provision was enacted providing that banks may de-
liver the contents of safety deposit boxes to foreign personal representa-
tives, unless a Florida representative was appointed.'24 It is to be
wondered why the mandatory word "shall" was used in the first statute
above and the permissive word "may" in the latter statute?
Section 659.05 of the Florida statutes was amended by providing
that a bank or trust company upon opening for business "shall have
power to engage in a general banking or trust business and to exercise,
subject to law and the approval of the commissioner, all such incidental
powers as may reasonably promote its general banking or trust busi-
ness. Y)
12 5
Non-banking institutions which sell money orders, checks and
travelers checks are now to be regulated under the "Sale of Money
Orders Act" which provides for very detailed licensing requirements." 6
Although the act would seem directed at protecting the public, it seems
rather obvious that its main purpose is to protect the banks from
competition.
Section 659.20(2) and (3) of the Florida statutes was amended
by designating certain types of securities eligible for investment by
banks and trust companies without limitation in amount and other
types of securities eligible for investment in limited amounts. 127
XIV. BAD CHECK LAWS
A drawer of a worthless check who gives it in exchange for his
prior worthless check is guilty of obtaining "a thing of value" by means
123. FLA. LAWS 1965, ch. 65-107, amending FLA. STAT. § 654.04 (1963).
124. FLA. LAWS 1965, ch. 65-108.
125. FLA. LAWS 1965, ch. 65-37, amending FLA. STAT. 659.05 (1963).
126. FLA. LAWS 1965, ch. 65-174.
127. FLA. LAWS 1965, ch. 65-177, amending FLA. STAT. § 659.20(2) and (3) (1963).
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of the second worthless check.' 28 The value concept rests on the notion
of inducing the payee of the first check to return it by parting with
the evidence of a debt and of a crime represented by the first check
(the crime consisting in the obtaining of money in exchange for the
first check).129
A. Legislation
The Legislature has adopted a statute' providing that whoever
stops payment on a check for which he has received goods or services
with the intent to defraud shall be guilty of a felony (punishable by
not more than two years imprisonment) if the goods or services are
valued at fifty dollars, or of a misdemeanor if the goods and services
are valued at less than this amount.
128. FiA. STAT. § 832.05(3) (1963).
129. McCormick v. State, 161 So.2d 696 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
130. FLA. LAws 1965, ch. 65-413.
